Abstract
This research develops a new argument that departs from traditional theories that explain the potential impact of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Chiefs Executive Officers (CEOs) compensation. More specifically, we argue that if CSR investments provide value for firm’s shareholders and stakeholders, they can also decrease firm’s competitors’ value (negative externality hypothesis). As a result, inefficient CEO compensation may arise even if CSR choice allows managers to act in the best interest of firm’s shareholders and non-investing stakeholders. In sum, our new perspective indicates that excessive levels of CEO compensation are more than a principal-agent-stakeholder problem. In addition, our new theoretical argument suggests that voluntarily CSR should not be a relevant factor for achieving efficient levels of CEO compensation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 15-31 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Mar 2020 |
Keywords
- Corporate social responsibility
- CEO compensation
- Negative externality
- Market failure
- Stakeholder`s management
- Public interest theory
Access to Document
- Bouslah_2020_JFRP_Earlycorporate_VoR_CCBYSA
Copyright © 2020 by the authors. Licensee ACRN Publishing, Austria, Editor in Chief Prof. Dr. Othmar M. Lehner. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY SA) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)