Contrastive reasons and promotion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A promising but underexplored view about normative reasons is contrastivism, which holds that considerations are fundamentally reasons for things only relative to sets of alternatives. Contrastivism gains an advantage by holding that reasons relative to different sets of alternatives can be independent of one another. But this feature also raises a serious problem: we need some way of constraining this independence. I develop a version of contrastivism that provides the needed constraints and that is independently motivated by the widespread idea that reasons involve the promotion of various kinds of objectives.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)39-63
Number of pages25
JournalEthics
Volume125
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014

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