Contextualism About Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness

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4 Citations (Scopus)


To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe’s response to combat both paradoxes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)167-190
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2005


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