@techreport{76f72b70bfa44a70b07dcf1e6f3df24e,
title = "Consumption decisions when people value conformity",
abstract = "In this paper we assume that for some commodities individuals may wish to adjust their levels of consumption from their normal Marshallian levels so as to match the consumption levels of a group of other individuals, in order to signal that they conform to the consumption norms of that group. Unlike Veblen{\textquoteright}s concept of conspicuous consumption this can mean that some individuals may reduce their consumption of the relevant commodities. We model this as a three-stage game in which individuals first decide whether or not they wish to adhere to a norm, then decide which norm they wish to adhere to, and finally decide their actual consumption. We present a number of examples of the resulting equilibria, and then discuss the potential policy implications of this model.",
keywords = "strength of adherence to norms, desire for conformity, norm-consistent consumption interval, participation-consistent consumption interval, Nash equilibrium of three-stage game",
author = "Ulph, {David Tregear} and Alistair Ulph",
year = "2014",
month = oct,
day = "1",
language = "English",
series = "School of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper",
publisher = "University of St Andrews",
number = "1414",
pages = "1--29",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of St Andrews",
}