Completing the European Banking Union: capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers

Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
1 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks in the European Union (EU). Using the staggered BRRD implementation across 15 member states, we identify banks’ capital cost responses and subsequent pass-through to borrowers towards surprise elements due to national transposition details. Average bank capital costs increase heterogeneously across countries with strongest funding cost hikes observed for banks located in GIIPS and non-EMU countries. Only banks in core E(M)U countries that exhibit higher funding costs increase credit spreads for corporate borrowers and contract credit supply. Tighter credit conditions are only passed on to more levered and less profitable firms. On balance, the national implementation of BRRD appears to have strengthened financial system resilience without a pervasive hike in borrowing costs.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104229
Number of pages22
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume148
Early online date29 Jul 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2022

Keywords

  • Bail-in
  • Bank funding costs
  • Corporate sector transmission
  • European Banking Union

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Completing the European Banking Union: capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this