Commonsense, skeptical theism, and different sorts of closure of inquiry defeat

Jonathan Rutledge

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Trent Dougherty argues (contra Jonathan Matheson) that when taking into consideration the probabilities involving skeptical theism (ST) and gratuitous evils, an agent may reasonably affirm both ST and that gratuitous evils exist. In other words, Dougherty thinks that assigning a greater than .5 probability to ST is insufficient to defeat the commonsense problem of evil. I argue that Dougherty’s response assumes, incorrectly, that ST functions solely as an evidential defeater, and that, when understood as a closure of inquiry defeater, ST may still defeat reasonable belief in gratuitous evils, even in the face of strong evidence that gratuitous evils exist.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17-32
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Volume34
Issue number1
Early online date28 Feb 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Commonsense, skeptical theism, and different sorts of closure of inquiry defeat'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this