Collective choice functions on non-convex problems

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Collective choice problems on sets in R-+(n) arise naturally in economics. Such problems have been extensively studied both in the theory of revealed preferences (Peters and Wakker, 1991) and in axiomatic bargaining theory under the assumption of convexity. However, our knowledge of collective choice functions on non-convex problems is still patchy. In this paper I study the existence and characterisation of continuous choice functions on the domain Gamma of comprehensive problems. The main result completely characterises rational choice functions that are continuous and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality: they form the class of Monotone Path Choice Functions on Gamma. I also show that any discontinuous rational and weakly Pareto optimal choice function must be non-anonymous.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)457-463
    Number of pages7
    JournalEconomic Theory
    Volume16
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Sept 2000

    Keywords

    • collective choice
    • bargaining solutions
    • monotonicity
    • REVEALED GROUP PREFERENCES
    • NASH BARGAINING THEORY
    • NONCONVEX PROBLEMS
    • RATIONAL CHOICE
    • ALTERNATIVES
    • EXTENSION

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