Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?

Franz Berto; Levin Hornischer

doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02007-4

Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?

Franz Berto^*, Levin Hornischer

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Sentences φ and ψ are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences φ1,…,φn where adjacent φi and φi+1 are cognitive synonyms while φ1 and φn are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3). Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2727-2752
Number of pages	26
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	180
Early online date	17 Jul 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02007-4
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2023

Keywords

Aboutness
Subject matter
Hyperintensionality
Synonymy
Defeasible reasoning
Cognitive content
Leitgeb impossibility result

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Final published version, 1.37 MBLicence: CC BY

The Logic of Conceivability: H2020 ERC The Logic of Conceivability
Berto, F. (PI)
1/09/18 → 31/12/21
Project: Fellowship

Cite this

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title = "Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?",

abstract = "Sentences φ and ψ are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in one{\textquoteright}s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to {\textquoteleft}dead parrot{\textquoteright} series: sequences of sentences φ1,…,φn where adjacent φi and φi+1 are cognitive synonyms while φ1 and φn are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won{\textquoteright}t do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn{\textquoteright}t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3). Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.",

keywords = "Aboutness, Subject matter, Hyperintensionality, Synonymy, Defeasible reasoning, Cognitive content, Leitgeb impossibility result",

author = "Franz Berto and Levin Hornischer",

note = "Funding: This research is published within the project {\textquoteleft}The Logic of Conceivability{\textquoteright}, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.",

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doi = "10.1007/s11098-023-02007-4",

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AU - Berto, Franz

AU - Hornischer, Levin

N1 - Funding: This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.

PY - 2023/9/1

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N2 - Sentences φ and ψ are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences φ1,…,φn where adjacent φi and φi+1 are cognitive synonyms while φ1 and φn are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3). Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.

AB - Sentences φ and ψ are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in one’s cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to ‘dead parrot’ series: sequences of sentences φ1,…,φn where adjacent φi and φi+1 are cognitive synonyms while φ1 and φn are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence won’t do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldn’t satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3). Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.

KW - Aboutness

KW - Subject matter

KW - Hyperintensionality

KW - Synonymy

KW - Defeasible reasoning

KW - Cognitive content

KW - Leitgeb impossibility result

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DO - 10.1007/s11098-023-02007-4

M3 - Article

SN - 0031-8116

VL - 180

SP - 2727

EP - 2752

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

ER -

Cognitive synonymy: a dead parrot?

Abstract

Keywords

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The Logic of Conceivability: H2020 ERC The Logic of Conceivability

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