Abstract
The first part of the chapter motivates a unifying
alternative to causal theories and description theories of reference and
aboutness. The alternative account is built around a claim which the
chapter argues brings out the significance for theories of reference and
aboutness of the fact that justification is truth conducive: the claim
that an aboutness-fixing relation is one which secures what the chapter
calls “cognitive focus” on an object of thought. The second part of the
chapter argues that a “singular thought” just is a thought made
available by a cognitive focus relation, and uses the cognitive focus
framework to advance the discussion of descriptive names. An Appendix
explains why, though the proposal is a “mental files” proposal, it is
better stated without use of this term.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Singular Thought and Mental Files |
Editors | Rachel Goodman, James Genone, Nick Kroll |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 11 |
Pages | 223-250 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198746881 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 6 Feb 2020 |
Keywords
- Reference
- Aboutness
- Singular thought
- Mental files
- Descriptive names