Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions

G Ecchia, M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    28 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues. We argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries (i.e. setting the rules of the negotiation game) and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)573-582
    Number of pages10
    JournalEuropean Economic Review
    Volume42
    Issue number3-5
    Publication statusPublished - May 1998

    Keywords

    • coalition formation
    • environmental agreements
    • institutions
    • bargaining
    • cooperation

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