Can animals reason? Hobbes’s theory of nonverbal reasoning and animal reasoning

This article reconstructs Thomas Hobbes’s theory of nonverbal reasoning and examines its implications for animal cognition. While Hobbes is often read as reducing reason to verbal computation, close analysis of Leviathan, De Corpore, and earlier texts reveals a more nuanced account in which reasoning originates as the imaginative “computation” of phantasms. While acknowledging discrepancies between different works, the article emphasizes their underlying coherence and development. It argues that Hobbes recognizes a form of nonverbal animal reasoning grounded in perceptual “comparison,” though he denies animals the capacity to engage in reasoning involving mnemonic or imaginary content. This account reveals a structural continuity between human and animal logical thinking, while also highlighting the limitations of the latter. The article situates Hobbes within early modern debates on reason, prudence, and universals, showing how his radical nominalism reinforces the primacy of imagination in reasoning. In doing so, it clarifies Hobbes’s contribution to the philosophy of mind and underscores his relevance to ongoing debates about the nature and limits of animal cognition.