Boult on normative expectations and testimonial injustice

Boult has recently suggested that there are two distinct ways in which testimonial injustice is epistemically blameworthy namely (1) when it embodies a kind of culpable irrationality in believing someone less credible than they are; and (2) when it embodies a deficiency of normative epistemic expectations of a speaker. Importantly, he argues that the second is independent of the balance of evidence and so provides a way in which testimonial injustice is blameworthy even in cases of contaminated evidence in which unjust social structures generate misleading evidence regarding the epistemic capacities of marginalised groups. I raise a number of questions about his appeal to deficient normative epistemic expectations including (1) whether it provides an epistemic answer to the question of when we owe it to a speaker to accept their word; (2) whether the kind of wrong involved in it is specifically epistemic; and (3) whether it overgeneralises, characterising the deficient normative expectations of victims of oppression as blameworthy.