Bargaining over multiple issues with maximin and leximin preferences

Amparo M. Marmol*, Clara Ponsati

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    8 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this class are constructed from the family of monotone path solutions for classical bargaining problems.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)211-223
    Number of pages13
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Volume30
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 2008

    Keywords

    • SOCIAL CHOICE
    • UNCERTAINTY

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