Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

Daniel Cardona; Clara Ponsati

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001

Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

Daniel Cardona^*, Clara Ponsati

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q >= 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q > n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	627-651
Number of pages	25
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	137
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001
Publication status	Published - Nov 2007

Keywords

bargaining
voting
qualified majority
one-dimensional policies
single-peaked preferences
public good location
MODEL
EQUILIBRIUM
UNIQUENESS
COALITION

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10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001

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title = "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices",

abstract = "We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q >= 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q > n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "bargaining, voting, qualified majority, one-dimensional policies, single-peaked preferences, public good location, MODEL, EQUILIBRIUM, UNIQUENESS, COALITION",

author = "Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsati",

year = "2007",

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AU - Cardona, Daniel

AU - Ponsati, Clara

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AB - We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q >= 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q > n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - bargaining

KW - voting

KW - qualified majority

KW - one-dimensional policies

KW - single-peaked preferences

KW - public good location

KW - MODEL

KW - EQUILIBRIUM

KW - UNIQUENESS

KW - COALITION

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 137

SP - 627

EP - 651

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

Abstract

Keywords

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