Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

Daniel Cardona*, Clara Ponsati

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    18 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q >= 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q > n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)627-651
    Number of pages25
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume137
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Nov 2007

    Keywords

    • bargaining
    • voting
    • qualified majority
    • one-dimensional policies
    • single-peaked preferences
    • public good location
    • MODEL
    • EQUILIBRIUM
    • UNIQUENESS
    • COALITION

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