Authority and group assertion

Speakers naturally attribute assertions to groups, but what makes it the case that groups assert? The standard assumption today is that there are two kinds of group assertion: one distinguished by joint-intentional coordination and the other by spokespersons representing the group Lackey (The epistemology of groups, 2021); Ludwig (Language & Communication, 70, 2020b); Marsili (Topoi, 42, 2023). In this paper, I reject this analysis (which I call ‘the disjunctive view’), arguing that it provides neither necessary conditions—because it does not account for some cases of assertions made by research groups (I label these ‘radically collaborative assertions’)—nor sufficient conditions for group assertion—as it fails to rule out groups who are proxies for individuals. Instead, I propose a unified account of group assertion: the authority account. I claim that a special kind of entitlement distinguishes group assertion from individual assertion: the authority to assert on behalf of a group. Speakers (whether singly or in collections) perform group assertions only if they exercise this authority. I argue that, unlike previous accounts, my proposal explains what is common to all cases of group assertion, accommodates all cases, and succeeds in distinguishing group and individual assertions.