Antitelic essences in Spinoza’s “mystical atheism”

This paper defends Brook Ziporyn’s interpretation of Spinoza as a “mystical atheist”, taken here to mean a philosopher who believes not only that there is no inherent purpose in the cosmos but also that this cosmic purposelessness should serve as a model for human life. I argue that Spinoza does indeed hold this view, but that a potential objection arises from his essentialism. Spinoza’s Ethics seems to imply that humans, along with all other particular things, must strive to pursue a limited inherent purpose, defined by their essence. This would be at odds with the mystical atheist recommendation to emulate the cosmic purposelessness. I argue that this objection can be overcome by recognising that essences in Spinoza are very different from essences in the Western philosophical tradition. Essences are antitelic in Spinoza. Each thing essentially strives to be and act in as many different ways as possible. Things only actually strive in particular limited ways due to being thwarted in the full exercise of their power by external things. At the essential level, not only humans but all things strive fundamentally to emulate the purposelessness of the cosmos, in line with the mystical atheist vision.