Anti-realism and epistemic accessibility

C. S. Jenkins

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


I argue that Fitch's 'paradox of knowability' presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist's commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to the paradox argument are reviewed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)525-551
Number of pages27
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2007




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