An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.042

An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring

Andriy Zapechelnyuk^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiple-choice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/. k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	24-27
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	132
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.042
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2015

Keywords

Axiomatic approach
Multiple-choice test
Scoring rules

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abstract = "This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiple-choice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/. k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.",

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AB - This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiple-choice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/. k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.

KW - Axiomatic approach

KW - Multiple-choice test

KW - Scoring rules

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring

Abstract

Keywords

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