TY - JOUR
T1 - An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring
AU - Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
PY - 2015/7/1
Y1 - 2015/7/1
N2 - This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiple-choice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/. k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.
AB - This note axiomatically justifies a simple scoring rule for multiple-choice tests. The rule permits choosing any number, k, of available options and grants 1/. k-th of the maximum score if one of the chosen options is correct, and zero otherwise. This rule satisfies a few desirable properties: simplicity of implementation, non-negative scores, discouragement of random guessing, and rewards for partial answers. This is a novel rule that has not been discussed or empirically tested in the literature.
KW - Axiomatic approach
KW - Multiple-choice test
KW - Scoring rules
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928691684&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.042
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.042
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84928691684
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 132
SP - 24
EP - 27
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
ER -