Alliances and negotiations

P Manzini, M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    17 Citations (Scopus)


    Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)128-141
    Number of pages14
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2005


    • alliances
    • multiperson bargaining


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