Alliances and negotiations

P  Manzini; M  Mariotti

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003

Alliances and negotiations

P Manzini, M Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	128-141
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	121
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003
Publication status	Published - Mar 2005

Keywords

alliances
multiperson bargaining

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003

Cite this

@article{58c90f9973ea4125b0a642a5820a8ca1,

title = "Alliances and negotiations",

abstract = "Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "alliances, multiperson bargaining",

author = "P Manzini and M Mariotti",

year = "2005",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003",

language = "English",

volume = "121",

pages = "128--141",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press/Elsevier ",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Alliances and negotiations

AU - Manzini, P

AU - Mariotti, M

PY - 2005/3

Y1 - 2005/3

N2 - Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - alliances

KW - multiperson bargaining

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=13944269635&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.003

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 121

SP - 128

EP - 141

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

Alliances and negotiations

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this