Abstract
It is argued that acceptance of determinism sits badly with the way we use
counterfactual conditionals when considering gains and losses in light of
how things would have been if such-and-such had or had not happened; it
is further suggested that one type of indeterminism runs into the same difficulty;
also that the difficulty may escape notice through failure to distinguish
different uses of counterfactuals.
counterfactual conditionals when considering gains and losses in light of
how things would have been if such-and-such had or had not happened; it
is further suggested that one type of indeterminism runs into the same difficulty;
also that the difficulty may escape notice through failure to distinguish
different uses of counterfactuals.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1 - 18 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
| Volume | CXIII |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |