A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication

MA Costa-Gomes*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    12 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    M. Rabin (1994. J. Econ. Theory 63, 374 391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ. 20. 568 587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth. Malouf. and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)104-136
    Number of pages33
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume104
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - May 2002

    Keywords

    • INFORMATION
    • preplay communication
    • experiments
    • non-cooperative game theory
    • COORDINATION
    • cheap talk
    • GAME
    • CHEAP TALK

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