A practice-based account of the truth norm of belief

Xintong Wei*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

It is a platitude that belief is subject to a standard of correctness: a belief is correct if and only if it is true. But not all standards of correctness are authoritative or binding. Some standards of correctness may be arbitrary, unjustified or outrightly wrong. Given this, one challenge to proponents of the truth norm of belief, is to answer what Korsgaard (1996) calls ‘the normative question’. Is the truth norm of belief authoritative or binding regarding what one ought to or may believe? If so, what grounds its authority? The aim of this paper is to offer a novel answer to the grounding challenge on a reason-based normative framework. I develop and defend a practice-based account of the truth norm, according to which, the authority of the truth norm of belief is grounded in what I call the T-practice, a justified social practice that functions to facilitate knowledge production, maintenance, and social cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-21
Number of pages21
JournalEpisteme
VolumeFirst View
Early online date19 Aug 2022
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 19 Aug 2022

Keywords

  • The Truth Norm of Belief
  • Belief
  • Truth
  • The Nature of Belief
  • Epistemic Normativity
  • Social Practices
  • Practice-based Norms
  • Evaluative Norms
  • Constitutive Norms

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