A novel process reliabilist response to the swamping problem

Sanford Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper aims to provide a novel response on behalf of Process Reliabilism to the Swamping Problem. Unlike previous responses, the present response does not involve conditional probabilities (as Goldman and Olsson do), it does not appeal to permissivism or attitudes towards epistemic risk (as Pettigrew does), it will not depend on the generality of the problem (as Carter and Jarvis do) and it does not embrace either evidentialism or evidence monism (as Bjelde does). Instead it appeals to the modal properties of those beliefs formed through reliable process-types. What is more, the argument is generalizable: while I will frame my conclusion in Process Reliabilist terms, it should be of interest to anyone who is a truth monist regarding epistemic value.
Original languageEnglish
Article numberanac062
Number of pages9
VolumeAdvance articles
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 19 Jul 2023


  • Modal epistemology
  • Process reliabilism
  • Swamping problem
  • Truth monism
  • Value problem


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