A model of agreements in strategic form games

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    33 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Because in a strategic form game all the possibilities of communication available to the players must be explicitly listed in the strategy spaces, coalitions and coalitional behaviour are not very often taken into account in noncooperative games. However, it may be desirable, especially in applications, to separate the basic strategic features of a situation from those strategic features added as a consequence of the possibility of coalitional behaviour. We define an equilibrium for the bargaining procedure called by Greenberg (''The Theory of Solid Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach,'' Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990), Coalitional Contingent Threat Situation. We argue that the crucial problem of expectations on the counterdeviations following a deviation can be addressed by defining ''coalitional strategies'' and studying the equilibrium of the extended game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)196-217
    Number of pages22
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume74
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - May 1997

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