@techreport{04c8f417186f4efcb9db06bcff16e474,
title = "A financial accelerator through coordination failure",
abstract = "This paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors actions, choose whether to rollover funding, or not. The uncoordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies the coordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analyzed.",
keywords = "Financial frictions, DSGE models, Global games, Bank runs, Unconventional monetary policy, Financial crises",
author = "{de Groot}, Oliver",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
day = "31",
language = "English",
series = "School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers",
publisher = "University of St Andrews",
number = "1902",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of St Andrews",
}