A financial accelerator through coordination failure

Oliver de Groot

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper


    This paper studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors actions, choose whether to rollover funding, or not. The uncoordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies the coordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analyzed.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationSt Andrews
    PublisherUniversity of St Andrews
    Number of pages52
    Publication statusPublished - 31 Jan 2019

    Publication series

    NameSchool of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers
    PublisherUniversity of St Andrews
    ISSN (Print)0962-4031
    ISSN (Electronic)2055-303X


    • Financial frictions
    • DSGE models
    • Global games
    • Bank runs
    • Unconventional monetary policy
    • Financial crises


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