A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

P Manzini, M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    24 Citations (Scopus)


    We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2725-2736
    Number of pages12
    JournalJournal of Public Economics
    Issue number12
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2003


    • voluntary agreements
    • multiperson bargaining
    • regulation


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