A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

P  Manzini; M  Mariotti

doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8

A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

P Manzini, M Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2725-2736
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	87
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8
Publication status	Published - Dec 2003

Keywords

voluntary agreements
multiperson bargaining
regulation

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10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8

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A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

Abstract

Keywords

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