My current research centres around two questions. Is there a God? What do we owe to future people?

This project explores the relationships between moral philosophy and an underdeveloped alternative to both atheism and traditional theism, namely: Ananthropocentric Purposivism (AP). This the view that the universe has a non-human-centred purpose – one to which human beings are irrelevant. AP is agnostic whether a purpose requires a personal creator. AP is worth exploring in part because it is a comparatively unexplored option – a middle-ground between atheism and classical theism. I argue that the metaphysical case supporting AP is at least as strong as that supporting either theism or atheism – by borrowing the best anti-theist arguments from atheists and the best anti-atheist arguments from theists. I also argue that we cannot settle the metaphysical dispute without bringing in moral judgments, and that those judgments favour AP. In short, either metaphysics supports AP, or metaphysics leaves the choice open – and then morality supports AP. Finally, AP has implications for moral philosophy – supporting a liberal impartial morality built on genuinely objective values. AP offers more robust values than atheism; and a more robust response to evil than theism.