Description
What is Epistemic Incoherence? In one form, it is roughly the idea that the concept of knowledge/justification is incoherent. In another form, it is the idea that the rules governing ‘knows’/’is justified in believing’ issue in contradictory instructions if sufficiently pressed. In another guise, it is the (related) idea that the demands of rationality are incoherent in that they place inconsistent requirements on action. These ideas have been kicking around for a while — see Vogel (1990), Schiffer (1996), Weiner (2009), and Spicer (2008). However, there has been little systematic scrutiny of the nature and scope of Epistemic Incoherence. The broad idea belongs to an older tradition that holds that many or even most philosophically interesting concepts are incoherent—an idea found in Dummett (1975) and Wittgenstein; see also Frege and Tarski (1944). This workshop aims to explore just what Epistemic Incoherence amounts to and whether it is a useful notion in coming to understand the many puzzles and paradoxes concerning knowledge.Confirmed speakers are: Herman Cappelen (Oslo) Matti Eklund (Uppsala) Claire Field (St Andrews) Patrick Greenough (St Andrews) Nick Hughes (St Andrews) Gillian Russell (UNC Chapel Hill) Kevin Scharp (Ohio State) Elia Zardini (Lisbon)
| Period | 6 Dec 2015 → 7 Dec 2015 |
|---|---|
| Event type | Workshop |
| Location | United KingdomShow on map |
| Degree of Recognition | International |